I am a Visiting Assistant Professor at Oklahoma State University. I received a PhD from the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. My research combines formal theory, statistical modeling, and case studies to examine the politics of international conflict processes. I focus on the domestic politics of international security and military cooperation, how the politics of military spending shapes leaders' wartime decisions, and the political and economic constraints governments face when expanding or mobilizing their military.
I earned an MA from the Department of Government at UT Austin in 2018. I was also Graduate Fellow of the Clements Center for National Security.
I am originally from Versailles, Kentucky and graduated with a BA in Political Science from Transylvania University in 2015.
Joshua Landry
Visiting Assistant Professor
Oklahoma State University
Email:
Research
Peer-Reviewed Publications:
Ethnic Preferences, Domestic Audiences and Military Coalition Formation (with Roman Hlatky), Forthcoming at Conflict Management and Peace Science
Ethnically-motivated domestic pressure can incentivize leaders to support co-ethnics via military cooperation during international crises. When a leader requires the support of an ethnic group to retain office, she may face pressure to support foreign co-ethnics involved in an international crisis. Supporting co-ethnics can bolster a leader domestically, but constraints on the executive limit a leader's ability to respond to ethnically-motivated pressure. Using data on 257 international crises from 1949-2001 and two case studies, we find robust evidence for the conditional relationship between co-ethnicity, the domestic political salience of ethnicity, and executive constraints on the likelihood of military coalition formation.
Dissertation:
The Politics of Arming, Postwar Power, and War Outcomes
My dissertation explains why a war's outcome is often an unreliable predictor of the postwar distribution of power among participants. I find that war outcome most directly shapes postwar power when a victorious government pursues war goals intended to constraint their opponent's ability to invest in their military following the war, such as installing a new government, or annexing territory. Governments are most likely to pursue such goals when they expect domestic political constraints will limit their own ability to invest in the military in the future. Therefore, expectations about the postwar distribution of power, a product of the domestic political economy of military investment, shape war outcomes, rather than reflecting them. My findings help us understand when and why governments pursue more ambitious war goals, when war changes the distribution of power in the international system, and as a consequence, when war changes who exerts the most influence in international politics, and whose interests and values take precedence the international arena.
Working Papers:
The Politics of Arming, Postwar Power, and War Outcomes
The distribution of military power following interstate war does not consistently reflect who wins and loses. What explains postwar power, and how might it relate to war outcome? I analyze a model in which a state and an opponent attempt to reach a settlement dividing a disputed good in an ongoing war, and do so again in a postwar period. The postwar distribution of power reflects arming costs: as postwar arming becomes increasingly increasingly costly, states arm less, and therefore bargain from a weaker position. High postwar arming costs create a commitment problem which compel states to pursue more extreme war outcomes to avoid postwar weakness. The introduction of a coalition partner can mitigate the commitment problem created by high postwar arming costs. However, the prospect of postwar cooperation can also compel a state to pursue more extreme war goals even with low postwar arming costs. The model clarifies the relationship between war outcome and postwar power: rather than reflecting outcome, concern about the postwar distribution of power and its implications for future bargaining determine the war outcomes governments pursue.
Ethnic Politics and Alliance Formation (with Roman Hlatky)
Does co-ethnicity motivate alliance formation? We argue co-ethnic governments form alliances to either protect their own regime from potential threats or their protect the regime of their alliance partner. Further, the specific obligations included in alliance agreements reached by co-ethnic governments will reflect the nature of the threat to each regime. Internal threats from ethnic minorities motivate co-ethnic governments to form consultation agreements, while external security threats lead to defense pacts. Using data including 8,785 directed-dyads from 1946-2003, we find evidence the effect of co-ethnicity on alliance formation depends on (a) the nature of the threat (internal vs external) each government faces, and (b) the type of alliance formed.
Interstate War Demobilization: How Domestic Political Pressure Shapes Interstate Peace Settlements
Theories of domestic politics and wartime bargaining between countries generally end when the shooting stops. How do domestic politics continue to shape interstate bargaining following ceasefire? I analyze a formal model in which a government seeks to maximize its gains while negotiating a peace settlement while subject to removal from office by its domestic public. When leaders face political punishment for failing to demobilize their military, fear of losing office motivates them to begin sending soldiers home, reducing their bargaining power during peace negotiations. However, leaders may expect greater political costs should they begin demobilization, such as unemployment and inflation created by returning soldiers and reversion to a peacetime economy. In this case, leaders are incentivized to remain mobilized throughout peace negotiations, improving their negotiating position in comparison.
Teaching
Graduate Courses:
- GOV 385N: Introduction to Formal Political Analysis, Teaching Assistant
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Spring 2020
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Spring 2019
Undergraduate Courses:
- POLS 1113 - American Government, Instructor
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Spring 2024, Fall 2023
- GOV 312L: International Security, Instructor
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Spring 2022
- GOV 306C: Politics and Government in Contemporary Texas, Instructor (with Jim Henson)
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Summer 2021
- GOV 360I: The Politics of International Trade, Instructor (with Nate Jensen)
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Fall 2020
- GOV 360N: International Security, Teaching Assistant
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Fall 2019
- GOV 312L: US Foreign Policy, Teaching Assistant
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Fall 2018
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Spring 2018
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Summer 2017
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Spring 2017
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Fall 2016
- GOV 310L: American Government, Teaching Assistant
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Fall 2017, 2023
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Spring 2023